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The American whaling industry reached a peak of activity in the early 1850s; 
hunting waned slightly as the decade wore on and declined precipitately after 
1860 (see table 1.2). The story of  the rise and fall of  the industry is told in 
detail in chapters 12 and 13, and chapter 9 analyses the role of demand shifts 
during the period of contraction. Although changes in demand are usually ac- 
corded the leading role in the story of the industry's demise, three supply-side 
factors also appear in standard accounts: (1) the quality of American whaling 
crews deteriorated, (2) the costs of whaling vessels rose, and (3)  overhunting 
depleted the stocks of whales. These factors are supposed to have shifted the 
whaling supply schedule to the left, which, ceteris paribus, should have forced 
the industry to contract. Chapter 5  considers the first factor, chapter 6, the 
second, and this chapter, the third.' 
Many students of the subject have concluded that one reason the American 
whale fisheries declined was that whales became scarce.*  Their evidence, how- 
ever, has been either incomplete or indirect. There have been careful studies of 
individual whale groups, as well as attempts to infer changes in whale stocks 
from shifts in whaling productivity  or from the complaints of  unsuccessful 
whaling captains. There has been no comprehensive effort to consider the scale 
of nineteenth-century  hunting in the context of preexisting  populations  and 
potential levels of  reproduction. This chapter is intended to make good the 
deficiency. That is, it brings together fairly comprehensive estimates of  the 
numbers of hunted whales toward the beginning of the nineteenth century, cal- 
l.  Crew quality and whale stocks are also treated in chapter 8, and other aspects of supply are 
discussed in chapters 7, 10, and  11. 
2.  See  Hohman  1928, 290,  297-300;  Bockstoce and  Botkin  1983,  107-41;  Burton  1983, 
132-34;  Shuster 1972, 345-57; Maran 1974; Spears [I8761 1926, xviii; Dulles 1933, 221; Nord- 
hoff 1895, 161-62. 
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culates potential  levels of net reproduction, compares these figures with the 
rates of nineteenth-century hunting, and reaches conclusions about depletion. 
The impact of depletion (if there was depletion) on the industry would have 
been a function not only of the diminution of whale populations, but also of 
the sensitivity  of  whaling  productivity to diminished numbers. Productivity 
could have been affected long before populations became endangered.  It is 
also possible that hunting led to shifts in the behavior of whales that reduced 
their reproductive abilities or made them warier and more difficult to capture. 
Any of these developments, if it took place, would have acted to reduce whal- 
ing productivity. The course of productivity change is considered in chapter 8. 
The present chapter is concerned exclusively with the issue of depletion. There 
is one overarching question: were whale populations hunted down far enough 
by the late 1850s to make it likely that American whaling contracted for lack 
of whales? 
Marine biologists have learned  a considerable  amount  about the feeding 
habits, migration patterns, social organization, mating customs, fertility levels, 
and  mortality  rates  of  the  principal  groups  of  hunted  whales. Also,  since 
whales have come to be recognized as endangered  species, much effort has 
gone into attempts to estimate the effects of hunting and the capacity of whale 
stocks to recover from overhunting. In part such work rests on direct observa- 
tion; in part it is a result of theoretical model building. For example, California 
gray whales, a group that was protected at an early date and that has success- 
fully recovered  from overhunting,  have been the subject of  intense observa- 
tied Again, the demography of particular groups of whales has been mod- 
eled.4 These models have made it possible to predict the rate at which whale 
stocks would increase in the absence of  hunting, the forces that would bring 
growth in a given group to a halt, and the level and structure of the population 
that would  lead to the maximum  sustainable yield-the  largest number (or 
weight) of whales of a given type that could be taken each year without reduc- 
ing the stock. This yield occurs at the population level and structure that pro- 
duce the maximum positive difference between births and deaths (or, alterna- 
tively, between the rate of additions to the ranks of adults and the death rate of 
adults), and it depends upon the abundance of  food, that is, the feedwhale 
ratio.5 
In general the models assume that, since the whale has almost no natural 
enemies other than human beings, the size of a given population in the absence 
3. “Locally, the gray whale became the subject of protection in California a few years later 
[after the turn of  the century] and of  total protection under the Washington Convention of  1946’ 
(T8nnessen and Johnsen 1982, 113). For an example of the observation of the gray whale, see Rice 
and Wolman 1971. 
4. See, for example, the treatment of  the sperm-whale model in Frost 1979, 19-21,73-74,  and 
appendix 8. See also Gambell 1976. 
5.  The maximum sustainable yield models-as  planning devices-have  been subject to severe 
criticism. For example, “simulation testing of the NMP [new management procedure] revealed 
that populations managed under the NMP were quite likely to be exterminated” (Dolphins, Por- 133  Natural Resources 
of hunting will depend on the available feed: krill for baleen whales (e.g., right 
whales, bowheads, grays, and humpbacks), and squid for toothed whales (e.g., 
sperm whales). Mammalogists believe that the adjustment process-in  which 
the population expands when extra feed is present and ceases to expand when 
feed is being appropriately exploited-turns  on the age of sexual maturity. 
They think that the age of sexual maturity falls when feed is abundant and rises 
when it is scarce.6 It should be said that not all of the parameter estimates are 
firmly based. There is also little or no direct evidence of the characteristics of 
the stationary population. Life expectancy in the absence of hunting is not well 
established; the impacts of hunting on fertility are not known with certainty 
(Frost 1979,65-73). 
With these reservations the demographic models may be used to estimate, 
on the basis of supplies of krill and squid, the levels of whale populations that 
existed before humans hunted on a large scale.7 Presumably supplies of food 
for whales have varied from time to time, but, as Allen points out, 
[whales] would be less susceptible to such changes [in food supplies, due to 
climatic changes] than many animals . . . . whales have a much longer life 
cycle than nearly all fish, and their reproductive pattern, with an average of 
less than one young per year, obviously does not provide the flexibility re- 
quired to produce the major changes in strength of cohorts which can occur 
with fish. Compared with terrestrial mammals, whales would seem to be 
living in a much more stable environment, which is not subject to drastic 
climatic changes such as droughts, that may occur on land. (Allen 1980,20) 
In any case, population estimates of the whales hunted by Americans have 
been made for the period preceding the rise of American whaling. They differ 
a good deal from one to another, but there is enough consensus to permit a 
series of useful conclusions to be drawn. For four sets of these estimates, see 
table 4.1. 
4.1  Did American Whalemen Damage Sperm-Whale Populations? 
The data on sperm-whale stocks are particularly complete; they omit only 
the North Atlantic populations, and those were small. The “original” sperm- 
whale stock (total population, exclusive of the North Atlantic) can be set at 
between  1,800,000 (Scarff) and 2,400,000 (Frost, Allen). Six hundred thou- 
sand is a wide range, but not remarkably  wide,  given the problems of  esti- 
mation. 
poises, and Whales 1991, 13). For our purposes, however, maximum-sustainable-yield models are 
a useful place to begin. 
6. The decline in the age of sexual maturity can be pronounced. It is believed that this age for 
minke whales fell from fourteen to six years, when the twentieth-century slaughter of Antarctic 
whales raised the krilYwhale ratio so pronouncedly. See Wiley 1985,42,44,46. 
7. The relationships among different types of  whales competing for the same food are a compli- 
cating factor. For example, the population of sei whales  apparently increased when the fin and 
blue whales were first hunted. See Gaskin 1982, 319. 134  Chapter4 
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Sources: Scarff 1977,332; Frost 1979,266-67; Allen 1980, 19; Bockstoce and Botkin 1983. 
Nore: According to Scarff (1977, 332) and Allen (1980, 19) the size of  the total population is 
typically about twice the size of the exploitable population. 
”Question marks used in the source, presumably to show uncertainty. 
bThe bowheads listed under “North Pacific” are in fact whales living in the Bering Strait and the 
Sea of Okhotsk. The grays refer to the eastern Pacific stock only. The bowheads listed under “North 
Atlantic” are those in Davis Strait and Hudson Bay only. The humpbacks listed under “North 
Atlantic” are the western Atlantic stock only. Three components of Frost’s estimates refer not to 
the period before the advent of  intensive hunting but to later dates: (1) sperm whales in one of his 
five divisions of the Southern Hemisphere are estimated as of 1946; (2) sperm whales in the west- 
ern division of the Pacific are estimated as of 1910; (3)  bowheads in the North Pacific are estimated 
as of  1850. The original stocks in all three cases were almost certainly larger than the figures in 
the table. 
‘Parentheses used in the source presumably show uncertainty, 
dThese are estimates of  exploitable stocks (i.e., mature animals) only. 
‘Several of  the totals are incomplete. 
Even the lower figure-  1,800,000-is  very large relative to the number of 
sperm whales killed in the nineteenth century. According to Charles Scammon, 
during the period of  most intensive American whaling (1  835-72),  Americans 
caught about 147,000 sperm whales and killed but lost another 15,000. Scam- 
mon bases his estimates on two assumptions, (1) that the average whale taken 135  Natural Resources 
yielded twenty-five barrels of oil, and (2) that many whales were harpooned, 
escaped the hunters, but subsequently died from their wounds. Scammon esti- 
mated that the second group (those that escaped but subsequently died) were 
equal in number to about 10 percent of the first group (those that were cap- 
tured), and that they were also of the same average size. Given these assump- 
tions  and  an  enumeration  of  the  barrels  of  sperm  oil  brought  back  by 
whalemen, he can-and  does-estimate  the total number of  sperm whales 
killed.8 
Twenty-five barrels may be too low an appraisal of the average yield from a 
sperm whale. Estimates ranging upward to forty-five barrels have appeared in 
the literature. The firmest set of figures-Best’s-covers  the period  1816-29 
through  1900-1925,  and indicates that the sperm whales taken by American 
ships and barks (a sample comprising 735 voyages) averaged 33.6 barrels of 
oil. Applying this value to the oil output data (see table 9B.1), and assuming 
with Scammon that whales killed but lost amounted to about  10 percent of 
those captured, one obtains an estimate of 177,000 sperm whales destroyed by 
Americans in the years 1805 through 1900. Americans probably accounted for 
about three-quarters of the sperm whales taken in this peri~d.~  The total num- 
ber killed by all whaling fleets would have been about 236,000. Substituting 
Scammon’s average yield  of  twenty-five  barrels  would  raise the  number  to 
33  1,000; adopting  Stevenson’s equally  well founded  average-yield  estimate 
of  forty-five  barrels  (1904,  187,  192) would  lower  it  to  184,000. That is, 
whalemen appear to have killed, in total, between 8 and 18  percent of the initial 
stock, in a harvest distributed across ninety-six years. Even the largest single- 
year American catch, that of 1837 (between 3,760 whales at forty-five barrels 
per whale and 6,770 at twenty-five barrels) was considerably less than 0.5 per- 
cent of the initial stock, and only a small fraction of the maximum sustainable 
yield that lay within the procreative capacity of sperm whales.IO  Modem levels 
of  sperm-whale populations also suggest that damage by nineteenth-century 
whaling  was  not  disastrous.  For example,  estimates  in  Frost’s  monograph 
8. Scammon [1874] 1968, 244. Scammon’s estimate and those we have substituted for it (see 
below) ignore certain elements of  the catch. Since Scarnmon and we base our estimates on oil 
landed, we leave out of account the whales represented by oil lost during the voyage due to leakage, 
oil sold during the voyage or shipped home in advance (to the extent such oil was not counted as 
oil landed), and oil that went down with vessels that were sunk. (See Best 1983, 42-43.)  The loss 
rate for New Bedford vessels (sperm whalers, baleen whalers, and nonspecialists) was 6.3 percent, 
but presumably the average vessel lost had less than an average catch, since it sank before complet- 
ing its voyage. Oil sold overseas amounted to little (Best 1983.42). Advance shipments of oil were 
not uncommon, but these shipments were recorded in the catch data. How much leakage accounted 
for, we do not know. At a guess the catch estimate in the text may be as much as 10 percent short, 
for the above reasons. 
9. Best 1983,45,  46. According to Best the United States accounted for 77 percent of the total 
output of  the United States, Great Britain, and the British colonies. The production of all other 
whaling nations was negligible. The figures for Britain and its colonies are likely to be too low. 
10. This level of procreation was probably never achieved, since the sperm-whale population 
never fell far enough below the carrying capacity of the food supply to set off those forces that 
would have raised fertility to its maximum level. See Frost 1979, 256-60. 136  Chapter 4 
(1979, 266-67)  show that sperm whales numbered more than 850,000 in the 
late  1970s. They have survived both  the American assault of  the nineteenth 
century and the much more formidable assaults of the twentieth. 
Sperm whales are distributed across the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans. 
If  whalemen concentrated  on individual hunting  grounds until  stocks there 
were depleted, and only then moved on to other grounds, even the limited catch 
described above might damage the capacity of certain sperm-whale groups to 
reproduce. Two sets of data-both  fairly small-suggest  that this may have 
happened in the Western Indian Ocean and in the Sea of  Japan, but the evi- 
dence is ambiguous and may indicate, not that whales became less numerous, 
but that they became more wary (Wray and Martin 1983, 226; Bannister, Tay- 
lor, and Sutherland 1983, 248-52).  In any case there is reason to believe that a 
scarcity of sperm whales-if  it existed at all-did  not affect the fishery as a 
whole. Peter Best's  study (1983, 46) shows no time trend in the average oil 
yield per sperm whale captured by American ships and barks, and also none 
for those captured by schooners and brigs, from 1816-29  through  1900-1925. 
If  the  population had been placed  under pressure, the  average yield would 
surely have fallen, if only because the density/fertility mechanism would have 
come into play. That is, the feedwhale ratio would have increased, the age of 
maturation would have fallen, births would have increased, and, because of the 
increase in the proportion of young whales, the average age and average size 
of the population would have declined, and the average age and average size 
of the sperms captured would have declined also. 
There are other reasons to believe that individual hunting grounds were not 
depleted on a large scale. Sperm whales are polygynous. A heterosexual pod- 
a group traveling together-typically  consists of a bull and ten or fifteen cows 
and their young, including some full-grown but socially immature bulls (not 
yet competitive with the patriarch). Two or three mature bulls usually trail the 
pod at a safe distance, waiting to take over the cows when the patriarch dies or 
becomes disabled. All other mature bulls have been driven away by the patri- 
arch and travel alone or in male pods. The patriarch-dominated pod is formed 
during the breeding season. After servicing the cows the patriarch leaves, and 
the pod is matriarchal until the next season. Between breeding seasons patri- 
archs travel alone. Pods of  socially  immature, but physically  mature, males 
travel together, occasionally with socially mature bulls who have yet to win 
harems." 
A very large fraction of the whales in the male pods, the trailing bulls, and 
the males traveling alone could be taken without adversely affecting the repro- 
ductive power of the population. Indeed,  successful hunting of these males 
might actually raise the reproductive power of  the group, by  raising the feed 
11. Frost  1979, 19-21,  and appendix 8. See also Hamson Matthews 1978, chap. 8, especially 
165-66; Burton 1983,76. 137  Natural Resources 
whale ratio and thus lowering the age of sexual maturity.’* Since mature male 
sperm whales are three or four times as large as females, they would have been 
preferred by hunters. Having chanced on a heterosexual pod, the hunters would 
choose-if  they had a choice-to  take the males first. As long as they did not 
leave the pod utterly bereft of  socially mature males, its reproductive power 
would be left undisturbed. In any case, if all the socially mature bulls attached 
to the pod were killed, the cows would recruit a new patriarch in the next, or 
perhaps even (less likely) the same, breeding season.13 
There is persuasive  evidence that nineteenth-century hunters did take dis- 
proportionately large numbers of mature bulls. Wray and Martin have gathered 
the records of nineteen sperm-whaling vessels over the years 1800-1887. The 
records provide various bits of information about captured whales: for thirteen 
the size or sex alone, for ninety-eight the yield in oil (Wray and Martin 1983, 
236-39).  The yield information is particularly useful. Mature cows and bulls 
are of very different average sizes, cows weighing only 30 percent as much as 
bulls (Leatherwood and Reeves 1983,82). Since yield was an increasing func- 
tion of weight, a full-grown cow must have yielded about 25 percent as much 
oil as a full-grown bull. The largest bulls in the Wray and Martin sample-two 
or three only-are  one-hundred-barrel  whales. From those observations one 
may  infer  that full-grown  cows in this  population  (Western  Indian  Ocean) 
rarely exceeded twenty-five barrels. Now, of the  11  1 whales for which size, 
sex, or yield information is available, 42 percent seem clearly to have been 
bulls; that is, they were designated as “bulls”  or as “large,” or they yielded 
more than  twenty-five barrels  of oil. Another  10 percent  were twenty-five- 
barrel animals; some may have been females, but some also must have been 
males. Moreover, of those below twenty-five barrels, many must also have been 
bulls. After all, nursery pods-the  only groups from which cows could be 
taken-would  have contained roughly equal numbers of immature males and 
immature females. 
Be that as it may, the first datum recorded above-that  42 percent of the 
sperm whales taken were large bulls-is  all that is needed to establish that 
hunters preferred to kill the largest animals available to them. If sperm whales 
had been taken at random from the total population, roughly one-half of those 
captured would have been immature, another one-quarter mature females, and 
12. That would be the case if the captured bulls were within the normal migration routes of the 
nursery pods. Bulls often leave these precincts and travel far north or south to squid-rich, but cow- 
poor, waters. Since those areas are off the nursery migration routes, taking such bulls would not 
have a direct and immediate effect on the food supplies of the nursery pods. It is also possible that 
the sexual activity of the patriarch is stimulated by the presence of  potentially competitive bulls. 
If too many of  the bulls trailing the pod were killed, its reproduction rate might drop. 
13. Harrison Matthews  1978, chap. 8. See Friends of  the Earth 1978, 153. Two contradictory 
positions need to be recognized: (1) cows were easier to kill than bulls, which might have induced 
hunters to concentrate  on them;  (2) whalemen might have  simply taken the first whales they 
reached, so that their catches might approximate random samples of the groups of  whales they 
attacked. But see the text below, and Gambell 1983, 15. 138  Chapter 4 
only about one-quarter mature males. Since at least 42 percent of the whales 
killed were large bulls, it is reasonable to conclude that whalemen sought out 
the largest whales they could find, and it is equally reasonable to suppose that 
they did not interfere with reproduction in an important way.I4 
Thus, given the total number killed, it seems highly unlikely that even con- 
centrated hunting would have depleted the stocks of sperm whales or greatly 
eroded their reproductive power. In any case the evidence indicates that hunt- 
ing did not follow a pattern of local concentration. As American whaling ex- 
panded, hunters very quickly moved into the South Atlantic, and around Cape 
Horn and the Cape of Good Hope into the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and then 
into the Sea of Japan and the far North Pacific. The fact that whalemen contin- 
ued to hunt  in  all grounds supports the  argument  that one ground  was not 
hunted out before whalemen moved on to another. 
4.2  Did American Whalemen Damage Baleen-Whale Populations? 
Quantitative evidence on the baleens hunted in the nineteenth century is less 
complete and reliable than that on sperm whales.  Frost has data by  sex and 
narrow  geographic region for sperm whales; comparable  information is not 
available for baleens. There are estimates of  the total stock of baleens (exclu- 
sive of those in certain grounds). As to the various types of baleens, there is 
good  information  on  the  numbers  of  bowheads  in  each  of  the  following 
grounds: Davis Strait, Hudson Bay, Bering Strait, and the Sea of Okhotsk. The 
same is true of the gray whales off the coast of California. There is only incom- 
plete information on the geographic distribution of rights and humpbacks. 
By  all  accounts  baleens  were  much  less  numerous  than  sperms.  Taking 
Frost’s evidence, adding Allen’s data for North Pacific humpbacks and rights, 
substituting Bockstoce and Botkin’s figure for bowheads of the Western Arctic, 
and using Scarff’s and Allen’s procedures to adjust the exploitable stock esti- 
mates to total population levels, it is possible to form a reasonable estimate of 
the size of the original population of the hunted baleens. The figure produced 
by this procedure is something in excess of 367,000 (compared with between 
1,800,000  and 2,400,000  sperms).15 
14. The data cited in the text are from Wray and Martin 1983,236-39. Best’s work more or less 
confirms the reasoning of the text. He identifies a few cows that yielded more than twenty-five 
barrels, but his research was not confined to the hunting ground studied by Wray and Martin, the 
Western Indian Ocean (Best 1983, 52). According to Wray and Martin, the Indian Ocean sperm- 
whale population consisted of relatively small whales. That yield was an increasing function of 
weight may be inferred from Best’s table 8. If the fifty-five-foot whales in that table were hundred- 
barrel whales, and if the thirty-foot whales were of a size equivalent to mature cows, then the table 
allows one to infer that mature cows averaged twenty-five barrels. In fact, the whales described in 
the table are mainly bulls; cows are said to be more slender than bulls. Consequently, the twenty- 
five barrel average is probably an upper bound on the true average value. Dropping the limit to 
twenty barrels would raise the share of  large bulls in the total of all sperm whales to 56 percent. 
15. According to Scarff (1977, 332) the ratio of the total population of baleens to the exploitable 
population is 1.5 to 1.0. Allen (1980, 19) puts the ratio at 1.3 to 1.0 for humpbacks. 140  Chapter 4 
Scammon estimates the number of  baleens killed in the years  1835-72  at 
13  1,000; once again, his figure needs to be adjusted. According to Scammon, 
the average baleen whale yielded about sixty barrels of oil. If Stevenson’s aver- 
age is used instead of Scammon’s, and if  one assumes that different groups of 
whales were taken in proportion  to their numbers, an average figure of  sixty- 
four barrels is obtained. Since humpbacks were less widely  hunted than the 
other baleens, even this figure is probably too low. If  it is assumed that they 
were taken only one-third as often as their numbers would predict, then the 
average baleen yielded seventy-three barrels. 
Scammon ([  18741 1968, 244) also estimates that whalemen killed and lost 
one-fifth as many baleens as they caught, a proportion that seems too high. 
According to Bockstoce and Botkin (1983,116) bowheads killed and lost came 
to fewer than  15 percent of  those caught. Since loss rates  were particularly 
high for bowheads,  and  since a bowhead lost by  one whaler was not infre- 
quently recovered by another, a loss rate of  10 percent for all baleens seems 
more  reasonable.  If  these  revised  assumptions  are  correct,  it  appears  that 
whalemen of  all nations killed about  180,000 baleens in the nineteenth cen- 
tury.I6  Even this figure is likely to be a little too high, since it rests on output 
data that combine the oil taken from blackfish  and walruses with that taken 
from baleen whales. 
On the one hand, given the initial stocks and the numbers caught, it seems 
that baleen  populations  were  more likely to have been  depleted than  were 
sperm-whale populations. There are two other facts that suggest the same con- 
clusion: baleens are monogamous and may even form permanent sexual attach- 
ments; the female baleen is larger than the male. The natural factors that helped 
protect the reproductive  capacity of  sperm whales from the depredations of 
hunters-the  small relative size of the female, polygyny, and the easy substitu- 
tion of  one male for another in the breeding  season-are  absent among ba- 
leens. 
On the other hand, the reproductive capacity of baleens is much greater than 
that of  sperm whales. According to Frost (1979, 19, 257) the pregnancy rate 
of adult sperm cows is about 0.19 per year (that is, about 19 percent are preg- 
nant each year), when the population is stable, and can rise to as much as 0.25. 
Baleen cows calve about every two years-a  pregnancy rate of 0.50.” Except 
16. Stevenson 1904, 192. The text statements rest on the assumption that the American fishery 
was responsible for three-quarters of the catch. 
17. Gaskin 1982, 309; Slijper 1979,389-90. Fin whales bear every other year, blues every two 
to three years, humpbacks four years out of five. Grays bear at least every other year and perhaps 
annually, according to Slijper. Rice and Wolman (I97  I, 117) find a fertility rate for adult females 
of 0.46 per year, which roughly confirms Slijper’s  judgment. 
There is much less information on rights and bowheads, but Frost’s statement (1979, 19) appears 
to cover them: “All baleen whales give birth and breed in the warmer waters within their range. In 
larger species this generally occurs every other year.” Slijper says (384-85)  that the gestation 
period for bowheads (Greenland whales) is nine to ten months, and that the lactation period for 
both bowheads and rights is twelve months. Gaskin (1972, 88), however, puts the gestation period 
of the right whale at eleven to twelve months and the lactation period at five to six months. 141  Natural Resources 
for gray whales,  who are bothered  by  killer  whales, baleens  have no more 
trouble with natural predators than do sperms.18  Rice and Wolman (197 1, 11  8) 
have shown that the California gray whales, in the period in which they were 
protected from hunting, maintained a rate of natural increase of about 5 percent 
per year.I9 
Whale populations adjust to the available feed. If  populations are reduced 
by hunting, the age of sexual maturity falls, the birthrate goes up, and hunting 
losses are replaced, so long as they are not too large. The extent of the rise in 
the rate of natural increase depends on the disproportion between food supplies 
and existing whale stocks. In the case of baleens the natural increase-ex- 
pressed in absolute numbers-is  thought to rise, as the population is hunted 
down, until the population has been reduced to about 60 percent of its maxi- 
mum size. If  the population  is driven below that level, the natural increase 
(again expressed in absolute numbers) is believed to fall, and eventually the 
whole population will be put in serious jeopardy.2D 
In the early nineteenth century there were at least 367,000 baleen whales. If 
they are treated as one population-a  procedure that is not legitimate except 
for  illustrative purposes-a  population  of  about 220,200 (367,000  X  .60) 
would have maximized the natural increase. That is, only if the population had 
been reduced  by  about  147,000 whales in a relatively  short period of time 
would the maximum natural increase (the maximum sustainable yield) have 
All of these figures are roughly consistent with the delivery of a calf every other year. Dolphrns, 
Porpoises, and Whales (1991) suggests longer birth intervals for rights (a pregnancy rate of 0.24 
to 0.30 [361]) and bowheads (a pregnancy rate of 0.15 to 0.27 [346-471). 
Biological information on whales is most complete for species that have been recently hunted, 
because many specimens were available to researchers and because strong efforts were made to 
enumerate these groups regularly. Of the populations that have not been hunted recently, scholars 
have the best information on the California gray whale, because the grays are particularly easy to 
observe. They calve in few shallow-water areas off the coast of California, and their migration 
route is within sight of land. Thus their activities are relatively easily monitored, and they are also 
easily enumerated. Bowheads and rights are more difficult to observe and, since neither group is 
hunted extensively today, biologists have few specimens with which to work. 
18. Henderson  1972, 36. But see Bums  1919, 237-38,  which contains an  account of  orcas 
attacking a bowhead. Rice and Wolman (1971, 98-99)  present evidence that orcas attack gray 
whales frequently, but rarely with success. 
19. A birthrate of 0.13 and a death rate of 0.08-yielding  a net rate of increase of 0.05-are 
given. Elsewhere, however, Rice and Wolman (1971, 131) treat the figure of 0.08 as an estimate 
of the death rate for adults and indicate that the death rate for immature whales “is more likely to 
be greater than that of  adults” (117). Since they view  the rate of  0.08 as an upwardly biased 
estimate of the adult death rate, it seems improbable that the computed rate of natural increase 
was much less than 0.05 per year. A second set of population growth rates, based on total popula- 
tion estimates, indicates that the gray-whale population grew at about 11 percent per year from 
1952-53  (shortly after the grays were protected) to 1959-60  (112-13).  “Trends from 1960 to 1967 
are uncertain” (131). 
20. Frost 1979, 70. It should be said that Frost hedges his account with the most cautious lan- 
guage. See also Matthiessen  1995, 70, which suggests that right-whale stocks fell much lower 
than the posited 60 percent, yet have begun to recover; and Rice and Wolman 1971,91.  Discussing 
baleens, Scarff (1977, 337) says, “A whale stock at between 30-70%  of its initial population level 
will exhibit a maximum net recruitment rate . . .  of only 5-7%  annually.” See also Lien and Merd- 
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been reached. In fact, only 180,000 baleens were killed over the entire century. 
If Rice and Wolman’s findings concerning the rate of natural increase of gray 
whales are representative  of baleen whales in general, the maximum sustain- 
able yield would have been about  11,010 per year (220,200 X  .05). That is, 
even if the baleen population had been driven as low as 220,200, whalemen 
could have taken as many as 11,010 each year, without jeopardizing the popu- 
lation. In fact, American whalemen never took as many as 7,000 in a year; in 
most years they took only a small fraction of that number. 
Can the Rice and Wolman results be regarded as representative of baleens as 
a whole? Allen (1974,356-57)  warns against extrapolating from one species to 
another, but he makes the point in the context of a discussion of overhunted 
groups. He points out that the gray whale may have recovered quickly because 
it employs only a limited number of breeding grounds; even when the grays 
had dropped to a small fraction of their original number, population density on 
the breeding ground was always high enough to ensure successful breeding on 
a large scale. He points out that other groups, such as rights, might not be able 
to recover so quickly. Scarff (1977, 337) puts the maximum recruitment rate 
(additions to the stock of  adults minus deaths of adults) of baleens at 5 to 7 
percent, which roughly squares with Rice and Wolman’s findings, and Rice 
(1974, 189) estimates that the maximum sustainable yield from bowheads was 
as high as the 5 percent recorded for grays. 
This chapter is concerned not with the issue of recovery from severe over- 
hunting, but with the maximum sustainable yield, a level that is reached long 
before whale populations are put in danger. In this context it seems safe enough 
to accept a maximum sustainable yield rate of 5 percent for all baleens. The 
question is not recovery, but breeding habits under normal conditions. 
The calculations discussed to this point have treated all baleens hunted by 
the American nineteenth-century  fleet as though they were alike, as though 
they bred indiscriminately across groups, and as though they were hunted in 
the same indiscriminate way. These conditions were not met, of course; it is 
necessary to look at individual groups separately. 
California gray whales represent something of a special case, although their 
peculiarities were shared, in some measure, with humpbacks.*’ They produced 
inferior oil and bone  and relatively  small average  amounts of  either  (about 
thirty-five  barrels  of  oil  per  whale).  Initially  they  were  not  easily  taken. 
Whalemen called them devilfish because they attacked the whaleboats. Until 
about midcentury they were hunted in the North Pacific by whalemen primarily 
seeking rights and bowheads but willing to take grays, if the opportunity pre- 
sented itself. Relatively few were killed. 
Gray-whale hunting changed when the calving grounds in the bays of  the 
Baja Peninsula were discovered. Whalemen then began hunting grays in the 
winter, chiefly as an off-season activity, when the pursuit of rights and bow- 
21. Much of what follows is drawn from Henderson 1972. 143  Natural Resources 
heads in the north was impossible. Previously they had shifted out of the north- 
ern grounds in winter and sailed to the New Zealand, Chilean, or California 
grounds to hunt sperm whales and humpbacks. After the mid- 1840s gray whal- 
ing became another off-season option-a  risky one, at first, but when hunters 
had learned to enter the bays successfully and had adopted the Greener gun (a 
weapon that allowed them to remain at a safer distance from their ferocious 
prey), gray whaling became an important activity. According to Henderson, the 
number of gray whales killed on both the northern and calving grounds rose 
from a total of  seven to eight hundred over the years 1846-54  to seven times 
that number over the next decade, but by 1866-74  the figure had fallen to just 
over two thousand. At that point, whalemen effectively  gave up hunting gray 
whales. The total number killed by Americans in the nineteenth century thus 
came to about eighty-two hundred (Henderson 1972,256-57). 
According to the most reliable estimates (see the figures given by Frost and 
Allen, table 4.1) the California herd originally numbered between fifteen and 
twenty thousand. (Scammon [I8741 1968, 23, implies that it was nearer fifty 
thousand-a  figure modem students of  the subject discount.) Following  the 
line of argument adopted previously, eighty-two hundred whales taken from 
an original population of fifteen to twenty thousand ought not to have destroyed 
the gray-whale herds, but gray whaling was a special case. Hunting was ex- 
tremely  concentrated  in  space  and  time.  The gray-whaling  era lasted  only 
about thirty years; once the calving grounds were entered, virtually all of the 
whales killed and listed in Henderson’s tally were females. The ability of the 
stock to reproduce was directly attacked. Many of the females were pregnant 
or left behind calves too young to feed themselves. Almost all of those calves 
starved to death, and they-as  well as those attacked and killed by whalemen 
to draw  the  mothers  within  harpoon range-are  missing  from Henderson’s 
totals. 
The slaughter,  then,  was much greater than  Henderson’s figures describe, 
and it is a wonder that the California gray-whale population survived at all. It 
did, however, and today is as large as it ever wasz2  Probably the increased cost 
of  capture due to diminished numbers, together with weakening markets for 
oil-especially  the inferior oil yielded by the grays-led  whalemen to aban- 
don the California grounds in time to save the remnants of the population. In 
any case the American whale fleet did not end its days for lack of gray whales. 
The grays, a species that probably  accounted for less than 6 percent  of  all 
whale oil in any year, were simply never central to American whaling. 
The bowheads of the Western Arctic are a second group of baleen whales 
for which there are good population data. According to Bockstoce and Botkin 
they originally numbered between twenty and forty thousand, in all likelihood 
about thirty thousand (see table 4.1). They were first hunted commercially in 
22. The California gray was taken off  the endangered species list on 15 June  1994 (News and 
Observer [Raleigh, NC] 16 June  1994). 144  Chapter 4 
1848. Pelagic whalers took about 18,700, or something more than 60 percent 
of the original population, before World War I. Again, the slaughter was con- 
centrated in a relatively short period of time. It was not, as in the case of the 
grays, a destruction visited chiefly on females, but by  1915 the population is 
said to have been reduced to about three thousand. 
In an attempt to reconcile their estimates of the original stock, the number 
killed by pelagic whaling, and the number remaining in 1915, Bockstoce and 
Botkin have simulated the bowhead population under a variety of parametric 
specifications. They have been  able to achieve a reconciliation  only  on the 
assumption that mortality  from all sources other than  whaling exceeded  re- 
cruitment, an assumption that initially seems implausible. The recruitment and 
survivorship ratios, however, represent values influenced by hunting. Bocks- 
toce and Botkin  argue that one bowhead  feeding ground  after another was 
hunted out, and the whales were forced to withdraw into always more limited 
feeding grounds (1983,  137; but see Tillman, Breiwick, and Chapman  1983, 
145; Breiwick and Mitchell  1983, 150-51).  In these circumstances hunting 
would  not  set  off  a favorable  density/fertility  mechanism  leading  to  more 
births, since the relevant feedwhale ratios would not rise. Even so, it is more 
than  a  little  puzzling  that  deaths-apart  from  whaling  deaths-exceeded 
births.  Perhaps  hunting  interfered  in  some  other  way  with  procreation,  al- 
though we know of no argument or evidence to that effect. In any case bow- 
heads, with their relatively confined feeding grounds, were probably in greater 
danger  of  extermination  than  were  rights,  sperms,  or  humpbacks  (Slijper 
1979, 395). 
Whatever the mechanism, the evidence suggests that the bowhead popula- 
tion had been reduced to about three thousand by  1915. Even so, neither the 
conclusion that the final collapse of the bowhead population occurred while 
U.S. whaling was still otherwise viable, nor the conclusion that the collapse 
contributed importantly to the end of US.  whaling, is obvious. The fleet was 
declining before the Civil War, dramatically so after the mid- 1870s, when bow- 
heads must still have been relatively numerous. The estimates of kill per unit 
of effort assembled by  Bockstoce and Botkin are highly variable but exhibit 
no clear downward trend before the 1880s. The index of total factor productiv- 
ity of  New Bedford  whalers  in the Western Arctic  (discussed in chapter  8) 
shows no unequivocal long-term drop before the early 1880s (see figure 4.1). 
At this point there were practically no New Bedford whalers left in the Western 
Arctic. These two indexes cannot provide conclusive evidence of changes in 
the stock of whales, since they are influenced by factors other than the avail- 
ability of whales.z’ Nevertheless, it is highly unlikely that developments pro- 
23. Bockstoce and Botkin 1983, 130, 131. Among the developments almost certainly having an 
important effect on productivity were a deterioration in the quality of  seamen on whalers and 
various technical improvements, such as the darting gun and the steam-powered whaler (the latter 
influencing the Bockstoce and Botkin estimates, but not the Davis, Gallman, and Gleiter figures, 145  Natural Resources 
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Fig. 4.1  Index of total factor productivity,  New Bedford whaling vessels 
hunting the Western Arctic, voyages ending 1851-83 (base = average 185  1-83  = 
100) 
Nore: See chapter 8 for a description of the productivity index. 
moting improved productivity would have been powerful enough to offset the 
effects of a drastic reduction in the stock of bowheads, had one taken place. In 
any case, if the American fleet had been forced to contract because of sharply 
rising costs associated with the depletion of the bowhead population, the kill- 
per-unit-of-effort and total-factor-productivity indexes would both have fallen. 
Given that neither index shows a marked downward trend, at least until  1880, 
it is doubtful that New Bedford owners, agents, and seamen were driven out 
of whaling by a shortage of bowheads. 
Data on the remaining groups of baleens hunted in the nineteenth century 
are much less complete. It is known that humpbacks were actively sought, if 
which cover only sailing vessels). The decline in labor quality tended to reduce productivity; im- 
proved technology tended to raise it. The Bockstoce and Botkin average weighted kill-per-unit- 
of-effort indexes are 1849-59,  ,179; 1860-69,  ,147; 1870-79,  ,111; 1880-89,  ,159; 1890-99,  ,083. 
Dropping  1849 and  1850 reduces the average for the first period  (now  1851-59)  to ,120.  See 
chapter 8 for an extended analysis of these issues. 
Conrad (1989.974-87,  especially 984-85)  disagrees with Bockstoce and Botkin. According to 
him the original population ran between fourteen and twenty thousand. By  1914 the  figure had 
fallen to about thirty-four hundred but had risen back to about seventy-eight hundred by  the end 
of  the  1980s. Our interpretation of  the connections between the number of  bowheads and the 
decline in the whaling fleet would be unaffected by our adoption of this account. 146  Chapter 4 
less so than other whales-they  had characteristics that made them less desir- 
able than most."  Their oil and bone were less valuable than those of  rights, 
and each whale yielded  smaller amounts of  both. For example, humpbacks 
averaged  only  55 barrels  of  oil, compared  to perhaps  100-120  barrels  for 
rights. Humpbacks were also difficult to catch; they are fast and agile and have 
long flippers  which,  in  the  death  throes  of the  whale,  sometimes  smashed 
whaleboats. Unlike right whales they sank when killed. When this happened 
in shallow water-which  is where the humpback was typically hunted-the 
whale could be raised, or marked  and picked up later, when natural  causes 
forced the carcass to the surface. (In this case, of course, the carcass might be 
eaten  by  sharks.)  In  deep water, humpbacks  could  be neither  successfully 
raised nor marked, but whalemen seem to have been able to keep them afloat 
by holding them on lines run to the  whaleboat^.'^ 
Since humpbacks have been heavily hunted in the twentieth century, there is 
no question that they survived the nineteenth in large numbers.26  How many 
were killed  in the  nineteenth century  is by  no means certain. The estimate 
of  the average size of baleens, discussed above, rests on the assumption that 
humpbacks were taken only one-third as often as their relative numbers would 
lead one to expect, but that assumption is a guess, no more. A guess of  some 
kind is required, however, if we are to get an idea of the extent to which the 
remaining baleens-chiefly  rights-were  under  assault. Assuming  that  the 
guess is correct, it is possible to make the following computation: 
Total number of baleens killed:  180,000 
Of which: 
bowheads of the Western Arctic  18,700 
California grays  8,200 
humpbacks, perhaps  35,000 
Total of the three above: 
Leaving rights, Atlantic bowheads, Japanese and Korean 
grays, blackfish, and the odd fin or sulphurbottom 
6  1,900 
118,100 
The original  stocks  of  rights  and Atlantic  bowheads  amounted  to about 
177,000. About 70,800 could have been taken before these populations were 
reduced to the level of the maximum sustainable yield. Once the two popula- 
tions (combined) reached that level, perhaps 5,000 animals could be taken each 
year without jeopardizing the stocks. In no year did American whalemen take 
as many  as 7,000 baleens,  a figure that includes, of course, Western Arctic 
24. For accounts of humpbacking, see Dulles 1933, chap. 20; Nordhoff 1895, chap. 10; Ashley 
1938, 65. According to Dulles, it was common for New London whalers to spend two summers 
and a winter at Desolation Island, hunting rights and humpbacks. 
25. Ferguson  1936, 130-31,  145-48.  The accounts on these pages apparently refer to hump- 
backing in deep water. 
26. According to Mitchell and Reeves (1983,  160-61),  4,053 humpbacks were killed in the 
western North Atlantic (including Iceland) in the forty-one years 1850 to 1890, and 4,810 from 
1891 to 1931. 147  Natural Resources 
bowheads,  humpbacks,  and grays,  as well  as rights and Atlantic  bowheads. 
Moreover, the 11  8,100 figure is a residual, and it is based in part on oil taken 
from animals other than rights and Atlantic bowheads: Japanese and Korean 
grays, fins (a few), blues (a few), walruses (many), blackfish (many). 
By the 1930s right whales had become so scarce that the whaling nations, 
fearing the rights would be exterminated, agreed to protect them from all hunt- 
ing.*’ Since data on twentieth-century hunting of rights are fragmentary, it is 
not clear whether the scarcity was a legacy of the period of American whaling, 
or a product of  late nineteenth- or early twentieth-century Norwegian hunt- 
ing.28  The absence of reported kills implies that twentieth-century hunting was 
not intense. After all, if right populations had been hunted down in the twenti- 
eth century, would there not be abundant data on the number killed? Not neces- 
sarily. Hunting records of  the twentieth century, particularly those reporting 
distributions among baleen groups, were not well kept before the 1930s. It is 
likely that rights were mistakenly counted with the more numerous rorquals. 
One must also take into account inaccuracies in the records. Peter Matthiessen 
(1995, 70) reports that Russian whalemen secretly killed thousands  of  pro- 
tected whales, including many rights: “A  single Soviet ship . . . killed twelve 
hundred right whales in the single season of  1961-62.” 
For what it’s worth, the rorquals  survived-in  the case of  the blues, just 
barely-a  much  more  savage assault  in  the  twentieth century  than  that  to 
which the baleens hunted by the Americans were subjected in the nineteenth. 
Between  1904 and  1978, 331,000 blue whales and 692,000 fin whales were 
taken in the Antarctic grounds alone (Tldnnessen and Johnsen 1982,75  1). The 
original  populations  of  blues  and  fins  in  the  entire  Southern  Hemisphere 
amounted to 270,000 and 607,000, respectively. That is, over a seventy-four- 
year period the numbers of these whales taken substantially exceeded the origi- 
nal populations. Both groups were damaged, but they were not driven to ex- 
tinction. By 1978 Southern Hemisphere blues probably numbered only 7,000- 
8,000 and fins 130,000. A much smaller fraction of the original population of 
rights was killed by nineteenth-century hunters, and hunting was spread over 
almost a century (Frost 1979,266-67). 
Right whales have characteristics that may have brought them more readily 
to the brink of extinction. Their numbers were never large. They were scattered 
over wide reaches of the oceans and were divided into at least three indepen- 
dent population  groups;  breeding  probably  did not  take place  across  these 
groups. Concentrated hunting could have lowered population densities enough 
to interfere with breeding. The slaughter of the rights may have opened the 
way for the expansion of populations of whales that were not at that time being 
27. Frost 1979, 31; T0nnessen and Johnsen 1982, 399-400.  But Matthiessen (1995, 70) dates 
effective control to 1949. 
28. T~nnessen  and Johnsen 1982, 736, 751. “The main exploitation [of rights] was ended by 
the 1920s, although even at the end of  this era right whales were more valued by whalers than 
blue whales” (Dolphins, Porpoises, and Whales 1991, 354). 148  Chapter 4 
heavily hunted-the  fin whales, for example. The only way for the right popu- 
lations to recover from hunting would have been through a rise in fertility, due 
to a fall in the age of  sexual maturity, the fall in turn caused by an improved 
feedwhale ratio. If the fins expanded into the space left by the rights, the feed 
fertility mechanism of the rights would not operate, at least not with full effect. 
As a result the calculations of the maximum sustainable yield described above 
may be too optimistic. Even so, the data do not suggest that the right-whale 
stocks had declined so far by  the 1870s that a scarcity of whales served as a 
major check to the American whaling industry.29 
4.3  Conclusions 
Most of the evidence indicates that the stocks of  sperm whales and hump- 
backs were decidedly not running out. The number of sperm whales killed in 
the nineteenth century is very small in comparison to the previously existing 
stocks and their procreative abilities. The same can be said of humpbacks. The 
picture with respect to rights, grays, and bowheads is less clear. Hunting was 
certainly a heavier burden to these populations, but it was probably not so 
heavy as to make them generally scarce by the time the American whaling fleet 
began its steep decline. This is not to say that they were undamaged by the 
American whaling fleet. The grays and bowheads were certainly hurt, and the 
rights may have been. It is only to say that the decline of American whaling 
antedated serious problems of whale numbers. 
Supply-side pressures that would have led the whaling industry to contract 
may have emerged even in the absence of ecological disasters. Hunting may 
have affected the numbers and behavior of whales, even in cases where there 
is little evidence of overhunting. It may also have reduced population densities 
of some whales (even if the harvest never exceeded the maximum sustainable 
yield), making them less accessible and their capture more costly. Such reduc- 
tions could explain the persistent search for new hunting grounds, even when 
the old ones had not been hunted out. Perhaps more likely, the whales may 
have become wary. William Scoresby ([1820] 1969, 172-73,  183) claims, for 
example, that when, in the seventeenth century, the Spitsbergen grounds were 
first opened, whales were so curious and unfearful that they “allowed them- 
selves to be . . . closely approached” by  the whaleboats, but in time they be- 
came timid. The same sequence was  observed in the nineteenth century in 
Davis Strait and the Western  As whales learned about men, hunting 
costs may have risen. 
29. If a scarcity of baleens caused the decline of the fleet, the real price of whale oil should have 
been rising. It did rise, peaking in the period 1851-65,  but, during the period of  marked decline 
of the fleet after 1865, the real price fell. See table 9.11. 
30. Bockstoce and Botkin 1983, 118-19;  Wray and Martin 1983,226;  Lien and Merdsoy 1979, 
48. Biologist Haven Wiley, of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, writes (letter of  12 
December  1986): “Ecologists interested  in predation  worry a lot about whether prey densities 149  Natural Resources 
Chapters 8 and  10 subject the total-factor-productivity index described in 
chapter 1 to analysis in an effort to explain differences in productivity over 
time. The impact of whale stocks on productivity is considered there in detail. 
The analysis of the present chapter suggests a hypothesis that will be tested: 
American whaling did not decline because of a shortage of whales. 
correlate with prey availabiliry and clearly they often do not. With specific reference to whales, it 
is perhaps important to consider whether  increasing wariness by  the whales might have had a 
significant impact on their availability to whalers in sailing vessels,” 